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Introduction 
The resurrection of the abandoned relics of colonial railways currently holds the promise of a 
revolution in transportation in Southeast Asia and Africa alike, as something good that can 
come out of the era of European exploitation of the region and the continent, respectively
2
.  
After all, geared as these transportation systems were to European commercial, political, or 
military purpose, rather than responding to organic necessity, they collapsed very quickly 
after colonial rule was over. There, the permanent way remained, scarring the countryside, 
rusting away as monuments to an era when indigenous political power had been eclipsed. 
Certainly, the development of colonial transportation infrastructure in West Africa and 
Southeast Asia is conventionally depicted as an entirely European political, economic, and 
even cultural intervention that helped to ensure colonial domination that was both a break 
with the past as well as the foundation for the kinds of states that emerged after 
independence. The major metropolitan magazines of the high colonial period paraded images 
of rail lines being cut through African lands in particular with captions that portrayed these as 
the main conduits of a civilizing imperial power. Little effort, with some notable exceptions,
3
  
has been expended on locating within colonial-era transportation networks, the continuity of 
pre-colonial administrative approaches relative to everyday life in non-western societies. 
Whether good or bad, or even where they were both, colonial railways, roads, and waterways 
were viewed as something new and they replaced, or displaced, rather than absorbed, what 
had existed before, however short-lived they or European rule generally proved to be. 
The notion that European rule and influence was brief, shallow, and territorially 
circumspect has pervaded more recent approaches to the state in both West African and 
Southeast Asian studies. This is so much the case that scholars have argued, often usefully, 
against using states as units of analysis or as the best way to frame socio-economic relations. 
Often the solution is to look at such developments and their historical backgrounds within the 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank the anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions as well as Tuong 
Vu for organizing the panel at which this paper was presented (the EuroSEAS Conference in Vienna in 
2015), and Claire Sutherland and Sujit Sivasundaram for providing comments on earlier drafts. The author 
also owes gratitude to his colleagues in Myanmar who aided in physical examinations of footpaths, roads, 
and railway routes. The Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, The University of Tokyo provided research 
funds for this fieldwork while the author was a project professor there. Thanks are also owed to Osaka 
University for the opportunity to present some of this research in December 2015. 
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 For Southeast Asia, I am making this point on the basis of personal observation during fieldwork in Burma (as 
well as in Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia). For Africa, see Sturgis (2015). 
3
 See, for example, the assertion made by Ravi Ahuja that the railways in India were superimposed upon rather 
than displacing altogether earlier patterns of land transport (Ahuja 2009). 
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context of particular ethnic groups. Such “anarchist histories” in consciously dispossessing 
the state to get at historical truth,
4
 run the risk of minimizing longer term, yet less visible 
aspects of the pre-colonial state that were absorbed into and maintained by, in regurgitated or 
hybridized form, the colonial administrative system.
5
 In doing so, they compromise 
contemporary understanding of rural economic development, whether by under-estimating 
the longer historical experience of state influence on mobility, or over-stating isolation from 
lowland economies. Consider the claim that rural Southeast Asia’s emergence out of isolation 
was due to the mushrooming of road construction since World War II, what Jonathan Rigg 
calls “a road-building half-century” (2002: 621), or F. Colombijn’s observation that “[i]n the 
past, roads did not play a prominent role in Southeast Asia.”6 These claims provide good 
examples of where the historical understanding of transportation, movement, and mobility is 
in need of reconsideration. Despite such claims, roads did in fact play a prominent role in pre-
colonial in Africa and Asia, whose populations, even those living in villages far in the 
interior, were far from being isolated.  
The present article seeks to demonstrate the important influence pre-colonial roads and 
overland transportation had on the emergence of modern transportation systems in modern 
Africa and Southeast Asia. To do so, it examines the pre-colonial and colonial transition and 
the relationship of the court and colonial administration respectively to changing 
transportation technologies and geographies of movement. It argues that certain pre-colonial 
attitudes regarding movement, transportation, and traffic had an important influence on 
emerging colonial transportation networks. The article examines central political attention to 
mobility, transport, and traffic (or not) and attention to the thinking about the act of 
governing them (or not) to reveal continuities attitudes that are invisible when looked at 
through the lens of technological and regime change alone. It is also suggested that these 
continuities provide one of a number of the inside stories of state formation and change from 
the pre-colonial to colonial eras in examples drawn from West Africa and Southeast Asia 
(including Sri Lanka) for the purpose of this paper. Ultimately, these continuities may help to 
partially explain other aspects of the directions these two examples took after independence. 
Rather than the colonial conquest being either a watershed moment or a temporary 
interruption there was instead a rough continuity in both the state’s relationship with and 
orientation towards mobility, transport, and traffic. Different colonial administrations either 
encouraged or discouraged movement and transportation, but whichever approach they 
followed, this was consistent with the pre-colonial practices that had existed before and we 
can trace the same ways of governing (or not) transportation, roads, and people during the 
pre-colonial, the colonial, and then the post-colonial periods. In other words, successive 
polities, whether patrimonial kingdoms, colonial administrations, or modern states, have in 
                                                 
4 One of the most influential of the works of this approach is Scott (2009). 
5 We might be reminded here of the assertion of the editors of one recent volume on the anthropology of state 
formation that in order to grasp anthropologically the “reality of the state” we need to consider both the state 
in the form of its imaginary and the state “in the concreteness of practices that have a state relation or 
reference” (Krohn-Hansen & Nustad 2005). Arguably, few practices have more of a state reference than the 
building, repair, and operation of road and the control of their traffic.  
6 Colombijn suggests that the relative unimportance of roads was due to the obstruction to road construction of 
the region’s “predominant vegetation type”, tropical rains, and the major river systems offering alternative 
routes of travel (Colombijn 2002). These are certainly valid points. 
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particular geographical areas revealed the influence of a particular governmentality (Foucault 
1991) towards this particular sphere of human activity that was different than might be found 
in another geographic, cultural, and environmental space.  
Such disjunctures relative to transportation have remained largely invisible because of the 
limitations of James Scott’s concept of state-space, or geographical areas that are 
topographically and climatologically easily governable, in whose domain transportation 
infrastructure is conventionally assumed to rest, on the one hand, and the assumption that all 
rulers wish to do the same kinds of things, namely exert control over geographic areas and 
people and make then legible to administrative apparatuses, on the other (Scott 1998; Rigg 
2002: 619-20). Twenty years ago, John Agnew referred to this theoretical cul-de-sac as the 
“territorial trap” and identified its responsibility for the framing of the understanding of 
administrative reach and socio-economic activities as co-terminous with claimed political 
boundaries (Agnew 1994). Considering transportation infrastructure, in this view, is not 
necessarily the same as studying transportation within a particular polity or even within the 
context of state-space at all. More importantly for our purposes here, As Agnew argued, the 
territorial trap obstructed perceptions of the necessity of understanding the emergence of 
state-space as a dynamic and historically determined process (ibid). 
It the position of the present article that rather than being irrelevant to governmentality 
regarding transportation and mobility, rulers have since the late early modern period given 
meaning to such governmentality. They have done so both consciously and unconsciously. 
Further, depending upon the orientation of this governmentality, this process of giving 
meaning has occurred when a government either asserts control over various aspects of 
movement and transportation or when it chooses not to do so. 
The research supporting this argument relies upon two main case studies, what are today 
Ghana (the colonial Gold Coast) and Myanmar (Burma). The Ashanti Empire and the Burma 
kingdom share many features that make them comparable. The British conquered in the 
nineteenth century over the course of three wars, starting with territorial loss along the coast 
in the south. By the mid-nineteenth century, both were of roughly similar size, the Kingdom 
of Burma being about 190,000 square miles after the Second Anglo-Burmese War (1852-
1853) and Ashanti including roughly 150,000 square miles at about the same time (Murphy 
1972; Esler 1996; Keane 2006). In the early nineteenth century, the Ashanti Empire had a 
population of three million people and just a few years before, at the end of the eighteenth 
century, Michael Symes estimated the population of the Kingdom of Burma to be three 
million people as well (Edgerton 2010; Burney 1842). Both of these areas suffered from rainy 
seasons and endemic insect-borne disease, in the forms of sleeping sickness and malaria in 
Ashanti and malaria and other diseases in Burma. Politically, both were ruled before the 
colonial period by kings at the top of imperial systems that ran martial or conquest states 
dependent on the building of large armies, territorial expansion, and the acquisition of 
captives. Both societies also viewed their polity in terms of what in Asia would be called a 
mandala with a center of power at the royal capital surrounded by concentric rings of 
diminishing central authority, a symbolic representation that was not coterminous with on-
the-ground administrative arrangements (Wilks 1976; Wolters 1982). 
12 HumaNetten Nr 37 Hösten 2016  
Pre-colonial Communications 
Despite the surprising similarities between these two case studies, there were important 
dissimilarities that had a significant impact on the trajectory of the court or colonial state’s 
developing relationship with people and mobility. For our purposes here, the most important 
difference was the approach to roads, traffic and movement and this was a result of the 
different productive basis of each polity. 
The pre-colonial history of Burma’s road system is neglected because of an early emphasis 
on the importance of maritime trade in Burma as well as on the sources provided by early 
Europeans who invariably came on boat and not overland. G. E. Harvey remarked of classical 
Burma (Pagan) that Burma even had no roads at all (Harvey 1983). Similarly, Maung Shein, 
whose Transport and Foreign Trade (1885-1814) remains the standard history of 
transportation in colonial Burma, comments that for the centuries prior to colonial rule, “the 
natural waterways of Burma, especially that of the Irrawaddy, were the only effective main 
channels of transport by which goods and people travelled” (Maung Shein 1964: 29). 
Moreover, Shein asserts, 
 [r]oads were not very necessary for the traditional self-sufficient subsistence society of 
Burma. During the dry season bullock-carts could make their way across the country 
over paddy fields in any direction, making tracks for themselves that could be used 
until the ground was ploughed up again at the next rains (Maung Shein 1964: 38). 
Similarly, in Upper Burma, aside from cart tracks, Maung Shein continued, “from the point 
of view of trade, it can be said that no roads of importance existed under the Burmese kings” 
(Maung Shein 1964: 39).  
In this view, the British found no real roads in Lower Burma when they arrived and 
modern overland transportation and government attitudes towards it begin with the British 
arrival (Ibid). This assumption pervaded the work of J.S. Furnivall and his effort to present 
the case of unbridled state formation during the colonial period in Burma. For example, 
Furnivall claimed that Dalhousie  
…stressed the importance of [British] road-making and … ambitious schemes were 
projected. One road was to be built from Rangoon to Prome ... Prome [was to be linked 
up] with India by a great highway through Chittagong to Calcutta ... The road from 
Chittagong to Akyab was reported almost finished within six months of its 
commencement and by 1854 the section from Arakan to Prome ‘was traversible by a 
horseman at full gallop’ (Furnivall 1948: 47-8). 
Yet, if we look back at Francis Buchanan’s unpublished “Burma Journal” from 1795, written 
a century and a half before Furnivall (and not having been subject to the same high colonial-
era notions of colonial economic development), we find that essentially the same road had 
existed prior to the British arrival in Burma: 
[the Myowoon says that] there is a good road by land all the way from Rangoon to Pyee 
Myoo or Prone. And a road for horses & elephants from Pyee myoo to Yakhain or 
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Arakan in 12 days and from Arakan to Chittagong (I suppose he means the frontier) in 
3 days.
7
 
Colonial attitudes towards indigenous roads showed considerable difference across the 
empire, even within the Indian Ocean. The contrast between Konbaung Burma, where the 
existence of roads has been more completely forgotten, and Sri Lanka where the old roads 
were seen as relics of a declining civilization that needed to be revived, is quite clear. 
However, in both cases, colonial engineers made use of indigenous road building, extant 
paths, and absorbed indigenous knowledge into what became “the bridges and roads that 
constituted the new colonial infrastructure” (Sivasundaram 2013: 238).  
Nevertheless, later historians of pre-colonial Burmese history, by contrast to their 
counterparts focusing on colonial and post-colonial infrastructural developments, have had a 
better awareness of the existence of a Konbaung Dynasty-era road network. William Koenig 
in his landmark study of the Konbaung period remarked that the frequent references to roads 
in Burmese land inquests and European traveller accounts from the period suggests the 
existence of a very important system of cart tracks and high roads interconnecting major 
towns and the royal capital (Koenig 1990: 56). Certainly, our growing interest in pre-colonial 
Burma’s overland trade connections has also underscored if not drawn more attention to the 
importance of Burma’s pre-British road network. A re-reading of at least one royal edict by 
the present author has revealed statements in the edict not to be merely references to pre-
modern border markers but instead to mark the points at which overland roads reached royal 
toll stations, where access to this network began or where it intersected with other routes.
8
  
One might also argue that portable, universal salvation religions, such as Buddhism, Islam, 
and Christianity offered to travellers in Southeast Asia (Reid 1993b: 151-79), the kind of 
protection against local spirits that travel shrines offered in Ashanti. Certainly, this has been 
argued of Pentecostalism in contemporary Ghana (Bruijn, Dijk, & Dijk 2001: 75-84), and we 
might find a similar role in the increased lay Buddhist associations and the provision of 
Buddhist charms in colonial Burma (Turner 2014). 
The existence of roads per se, however, was not the same as an open attitude to popular 
movement. Attention to the kinds of roads and tracks indicates this in the case of pre-colonial 
Burma. One kind of road was the royal or military roads. Like Ashanti, Konbaung Burma 
was a conquest state and had large armies that waged war fairly regularly against their 
neighbors for territorial gain, captives, and control of trade. The movement of armies was 
often preceded by both supply men who ensured that supplies of fodder and food would be 
waiting along the path of the army so that the army would not have to slow down to find 
them. Of course, there were also woodsmen who cut down trees, built temporary bridges, and 
generally cleared routes. Campaigns that repeated themselves might follow the same path at 
least part of the way and as a result, a military road would emerge and would open up a new 
route for travel for other interests. In Burma, there were several great military roads, such as 
the royal road in the north, that were designed to carry the great armies of the king on a 
campaign against an enemy who had been especially troublesome in the past and would thus 
                                                 
7 Francis Buchanan, “Burma Journal”, 1795, MSS Eur C. 12, f. 45, British Library Asia and Africa Collection, 
London. 
8
 Royal Order, 27 April 1637 (Tun 1984-1990: 1.265).  
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likely be so again in the future. A related example might be the An Pass that was cut across 
the Arakan Yoma mountain range for the Konbaung Army to bring booty back from Arakan 
in 1785.
9
 
Alongside roads, the Konbaung Army, like its predecessors, also built bridges in the field. 
Again, bridge building was restricted in both the Ashanti Empire and Konbaung Burma by 
the nature of the environment, not any technological limitations. Clearly, both could build 
temporary bridges. There are examples going back to the sixteenth century, of Burmese 
building pontoon bridges, such as that between Martaban and Moulmein in 1547 that could 
be taken by a horseman at a gallop.
10
 The case of military roads in Mataram on Java and in 
Siam would seem to bear out the Burmese example. Such military roads and bridges might 
then take on a life of their own, as local traders and others found them useful and contributed 
to the maintenance, repair, or even expansion of such roads without court support. This 
occurred with the great road through the Arakan Yoma just mentioned. About 1802, it was 
“improved at the expense of individuals” (i.e. without the support of the throne) so that it 
could handle loaded carts and thus became a permanent route through the mountains (Symes 
1955: 217; Than Tun 1983: 234-41). Additionally, the court or rich donors had a motive to 
build some bridges and stretches of road on occasion and even to repair them as a meritorious 
act within the moral economy of Theravada Buddhism in Burma, but these acts were limited 
in their effects in both geographic reach and regularization of repair (Ba Thann Win 1976: 
23). 
The Konbaung court disliked the autonomous movement of people on the roads, especially 
when it meant economically and militarily valuable subjects pulling up stakes and leaving for 
somewhere else permanently. One of the continual goals of Burma’s chronic campaigns 
against its neighbors was to acquire captive manpower to settle and work agricultural areas 
and provide royal service. In districts where royal demands became too intense, villagers 
moved if they could beyond the reach of the court, as was the case with the Mons who left 
Burma for Ayudhya (today, Thailand) and other areas at the end of the sixteenth century. 
Trade autonomous of the court also circumvented royal monopolies and taxes and hence was 
not good for the resources of the court. If the court could have afforded it, it probably would 
have tried to exert direct monitoring of and control over the roads, but the nature of the 
Burmese environment would have prevented this anyway. Much of the Burmese heartland 
was flat and dry and easily traversable on buffalo carts, even off of the tracks and roads. In 
wetter areas of the kingdom, such as the Lower Burma delta, the overgrowth was not nearly 
as impenetrable as the West African jungle and any road controls in the former would have 
been easily circumvented. Instead, the Konbaung court focused on the only feasible, cost-
effective means of controlling, monitoring, and taxing movement, by controlling access 
points to external trade, both overland and at sea, at the ports or major land crossings, or 
where land routes linked up with river ports. Thus, the autonomous myriad of local roads 
remained outside of their reach in a practical sense even if the political centre’s desire to 
control it continued. There is thus little evidence of roads being cut by the Konbaung court 
                                                 
9 In 1784/5, the westernmost Southeast Asian kingdom of Arakan (Rakhine) was conquered by Konbaung 
Burma’s armies and incorporated into the Irrawaddy-valley based kingdom. 
10
 “Nidana Ramadhipati-katha”. Translated by H. L. Shorto. TMs [photocopy], private collection, Dr. 
Victor B. Lieberman, Department of History, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan (n.d.): f. 47. 
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for the explicit purpose of encouraging or controlling trade (rather than for military or 
political purposes). These emerged independently of the government, on the logic of trade 
exchanges and were usually more worn between large population centres than between small 
ones (ibid). These were sometimes only paths that emerged cross-country, forged organically 
by the movement of traders who had no immediate access to the river. In Burma, there were 
also highlanders who came down to the lowlands and from the eastern hills to feed markets at 
the river ports where they would then enter a system of circulation run by the lowlanders 
themselves. All of these popular movements converged in a way that made the flow of traffic 
almost like a river, as described by Nisbet at the end of the nineteenth century about the 
earlier, pre-colonial era: 
[I]n former times, before the era of road-making, the country carts had to be so 
constructed as to be capable of traveling over very rough ground. The cart- tracks began 
in the fields whence the grain was brought on sledges or carts to the hamlets and 
villages, and gradually those single threads converged to form the main lines of 
communication, as small tributary streams are gathered together in the main 
watercourse (Nisbet 1901: 1.376-377). 
With the exception of special cases, such as the construction of a military road as mentioned 
above, the Konbaung Kingdom, by contrast to the Ashanti Empire was not a road- building 
project. Very clearly, in this case, roads followed the empire and not the reverse. 
One consequence of the pathways and roads in Burma not being government roads was 
that they, like much of overland travel in mainland Southeast Asia, suffered from the 
depredations of highwaymen. Robbery was a significant problem for overland travellers in 
early modern Southeast Asia (Nisbet 1901; Reid 1993a: 54, 57-8). Indicating the absence of 
government protection and the reliance on locals to help, robbery was more common in 
“thinly populated regions of the country” than in better-populated areas (Anuman 1987: 173). 
The chief strategy to fend off highwaymen was for travellers to move about in cart caravans 
(Anuman 1987: 173; Reid 1993a: 58). The customs posts that stood at control points in some 
parts of Southeast Asia as in Java (Ibid; Reid 1993a: pp. 53-4, 58), were not maintained as 
thoroughly in Burma. This was because, as I will mention again below, it was easier to 
collect revenues and fees further down the transportation chain on the river than on land, 
given the numerous opportunities overland travellers had to circumvent any such customs 
posts on flat country. 
Moreover, the Konbaung Kingdom developed no central infrastructure for road repair. 
Burmese accounts and traveller accounts alike speak of Burmese military roads as not being 
maintained by the court. A good example is that of the Ba Daung Taung Goke Road 
examined by Than Tun. Than Tun notes that although it was the historic conduit for 
intercourse between the Irrawaddy Valley and Arakan, was, at least until 1783, in poor shape. 
It remained a difficult track, unsuitable for carts, and lacking supplies of water along the 
course of travel, making the use of baggage animals difficult. Certainly, road maintenance 
here was much more neglected than the road’s counterparts in Ashanti. Here, there was 
nobody keeping up the road (Than Tun 1983: 239-240). 
One reason for the apparent neglect of the roads by the Konbaung Kingdom was the 
existence of the great Irrawaddy River. Admittedly, the Konbaung Kingdom lacked the 
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technology to conduct major river works, but the scale and capacity of the river did not 
demand it anyway. It was easy to rely upon the river for maritime trade but also to control 
trade that might feed the overland trade with China once it got there. By contrast, the onerous 
task shouldered by the Ashanti Empire to maintain the roads, the river made traffic 
management much easier for the Konbaung Kingdom. The idea that Konbaung Burma would 
have to invest in general travel outside of its own direct needs does not seem to have 
emerged. The shallow entrances to the Irrawaddy River meant that heavy draft European 
ships had to be piloted in carefully and the Konbaung Kingdom, which garrisoned Syriam 
and Bassein, was able to control access to the river system, the enforce rules that required 
Europeans to leave their guns and masts at Syriam before entering the river (Charney 1997: 
61). Like Ashanti, Konbaung Burma had a customs administration and a military force that 
controlled the interface between the domestic communications system and the outside world. 
Most customs outposts or kin were located on the international frontiers or on the access 
points to rivers, but not on domestic overland routes. There were also checkpoints on passes 
going up into the hills for overland travel that worked in a similar way. But, in both cases in 
Burma, river and overland travel, the court did not invest in the actual transportation 
infrastructure. 
Another reason for the Konbaung neglect of roads was that much of the economy was 
based on sedentary wet-rice agriculture and rather than capture people to sell abroad, Burma 
needed its war captives to open up rice fields and engage in other economic tasks. These 
resettled communities would play an important role in influencing Burmese culture and 
society, but also circulating technology, as historians like Bryce Beemer have recently shown 
(Beemer 2004). Rather than encourage mobility and movement as Ashanti did, Burma fits 
more closely the idea James Scott seems to have had in mind when he asserted that grain-
producing states do not like mobility. Instead, they prefer a fixed, sedentary population, not 
just one that remained within the royal domain, but one that remained tied to the locality, 
mobility being used, in Scott’s view, by nomadic peoples as a tool to evade the central 
control (Scott 2009: 184-5). In Konbaung Burma, there was no effort to encourage overland 
or riverine movement per se, nothing to expand flow, enhance capacity, or speed up everyday 
popular traffic. In other words, there was no elaborate logistical theory or methodology. 
Nevertheless, there were a myriad of controls on movement and mobility and no resources 
put to their disposal. These controls have been extensively researched elsewhere for pre-
colonial Burmese history and do not need to be discussed at length here. What is found in the 
Burmese and English language sources is a range of the aforementioned social controls that 
provided a proto-administrative or political obstacle to movement rather than an economic 
one. This oversight prevented previous scholars from identifying in pre-colonial rule in 
Burma a pre-existing administrative desire to limit mobility prior to the introduction of the 
British colonial state.  
The most important pre-colonial Ghanaian polity, the Ashanti Empire, could not have had 
a more different attitude to non-state mobility and transportation. The Ashanti focused not on 
sedentary agriculture, like many of the more popular examples used as case studies of state 
formation in the non-western world, but on commercial traffic that ran through the kingdom, 
the gathering of surface deposits of gold for export, and the capture and sale of slaves, at least 
until the mid- nineteenth century. The great road system built by the Ashanti has been 
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covered extensively in the historical literature, in particular by Ivor Wilks (1975). From the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, the Ashanti Empire had rapidly expanded on the basis of 
a particular take on the West African imperial model. This take involved developing roads 
that emanated out of the royal centre at Kumasi and either negotiating with local chiefs or 
conquering them when negotiations failed to construct further extensions of these roads until 
they could reach a point at which they interconnected with existing trade networks (a good 
example would be pushing a plug until it reached a mains). The empire’s boundaries became 
coterminous with the furthest extensions of these “great-roads.” The growth of Ashanti was 
directed at this kind of road building. 
Quite literally, the Ashanti Empire grew as a road-building project, empire following the 
road, rather than road following the frontiers of the empire. The reason for this phenomenon 
was that the Ashanti sought to benefit from the movement of trade through the empire and 
thus pushed out politically to link up with trade routes whenever new ones emerged or old 
ones shifted. Administration was introduced as a result of this expansion as the cutting of 
roads required political negotiations. This produced a model of imperial growth in which 
opposition to that growth was manifested in opposition to road-building projects. As Wilks 
has commented,  
A full history of the great-roads of Asante remains to be written. But it will be apparent 
that the development of the system was a critical aspects of the incorporative process. 
Indeed, opposition to the central government’s road building programme was one of the 
principal features of the syndrome of resistance to its imperial expansion, just as the 
closure of existing roads became one of the earliest indications of rebellion (Wilks 
1975: 25). 
As described by Wilks, the great-roads of Ashanti were the “conduits of authority” beginning 
at the capital and ending at the frontier. Importantly, how the Ashanti imagined the 
boundaries of the empire was not coterminous with its exact delineation on a map built 
around western cartographical principles. The mental map of the Ashanti kingdom, the 
positioning of territory, was a series of concentric circles emanating from the center on the 
basis of how much territory a man could cover in forty days, a homologue to use Wilks’ 
phraseology of the Ashanti month of forty-two days. Nevertheless, this indigenous imaginary 
did not reflect western cartographical representations in the south. Instead, the mental map 
fairly approximated the interior land frontiers of Ashanti. This was  
… a rational recognition of reality: that without any major change in the speed of 
communications, no lands more distant than a month from Kumasi, in and out, could 
effectively be administered even though they might be subdued for the duration of a 
campaign (Wilks 1992: 182-4).  
Thus, the regular reach of the court was more circumspect than the temporary and potential 
reach of the military. Arguably, the fiction produced by relating Ashanti state-space was a 
western map as a large circle shaded in equally across its diameter would have been no less 
accurate than colonial entities delineated on maps of Africa after the Congress of Berlin. In 
both cases, state-space hugged the main arteries of communication, an observation in keeping 
with the argument of this article. 
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Before Ashanti’s great-roads were built, travel had to be along streams as the bush was 
said to be impenetrable (Wilks 1975: 29). Ashanti’s “great roads” were built from the early 
eighteenth century to make cross-country travel less arduous and time consuming. An artistic 
representation of one of these roads can be seen in Figure 1. Political obstacles lay in the way 
whose resolution contributed to Ashanti state formation. When the Ashanti attempted to open 
a road in the second decade of the 18th century, from Kumasi to Elmina and the western 
coast, for example, they found the project compromised by shifting alliances with the 
chiefdoms through which the road passed. The Ashanti thus proceeded to conquer such 
chiefdoms and force their leaders to submit to Ashanti overlord-ship in a series of wars 
between 1715 and 1721. The Ashanti followed this in the 1740s by conquering Akyem in 
order to open a great road through Accra and to the eastern coast (Wilks 1975: 24). 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of Road Travel in Ashanti published in the ‘Illustrated London News’, 28 
February 1874 (Author’s collection) 
The Ashanti Empire also maintained sacred roads (and these were not inclusive of the 
entirety of pilgrimage routes). The distance between boat landings or road heads and sacred 
temples of the tombs of ancestors received special attention, including a ban on their use 
independently of their sacred function. A good example of this was the one-mile road 
between the Ashanti capital of Kumasi and the sacred town of Bantama, which the king 
visited every forty days in the mid-19th century in order to visit the tombs of his ancestors 
(Freeman 1844: 57). This was the location of the blackened stools of past Ashanti kings 
(Perbi 1992: 79). The population was only able to use this road when the king did so 
(Freeman 1844: 57). Such roads received special attention from the court, often being cleared 
regularly, leveled, lined with trees to provide shade, and even surfaced with stone. 
Aside from the sacred roads and roads in the royal capital, the technology and ability to 
surface or level roads and to bridge rivers did exist. This engineering capacity was clearly 
applied on special occasions, but the court could not afford to do so on a regular basis to the 
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same degree as a modern state. This was due to the environment. Ghana, like Burma, 
experienced heavy seasonal rains, the washing away of roads and bridges, and the clear if 
unpronounced logic of any cost benefit analysis made regular royal investments seem unwise. 
The impact of these rains on the roads outside of the towns, even within some towns outside 
of the royal capital, and even within the royal capital outside of the city centre is captured in 
the words of one mid-nineteenth century traveller to Ashanti: 
some of the streets are so full of holes, occasioned by the heavy rains washing the earth 
out of the fissures of the rocks during the rainy season, that any one attempting to walk 
through them in the dark, would place his neck in danger (Freeman 1844: 55). 
Even where roads were not washed away the rains greatly hindered movement, porters 
slipping constantly, dropping bags, and being unable to care elite people in the chairs on their 
shoulders (Freeman 1844: 63). When the rains stopped, vegetation remained a problem. The 
predominance of jungle and rain forest foliage and the infamous creeping vines made roads 
often impassable without considerable effort by the traveller. 
Road maintenance and clearing outside of the royal capital and sacred roads still remains 
an underexplored topic in the historiography. According to British military reports in the 
1870s, the indigenous population used these roads “as a latrine, and as a convenient place of 
deposit for all rubbish” (Brackenberry 1874: 1.315). The fairness of this description is 
questionable. The technologies and scale of labor of the day could only take care of so much 
and unless a “problem” was relevant to foot travellers, it was not a problem that needed to be 
handled. It was clear for example, that the Ashanti did take care of the roads. Freeman, for 
example, in his 1841 journal of his travels between the Gold Coast and Ashanti does not refer 
to foliage and overgrowth being a problem on the Ashanti side of the Prah River. However, 
once he crossed to the Fanti side, the road became impassable, Freeman relating that it was 
“so overgrown with luxuriant vegetation, that I was literally dragged through the bushes, and 
was soon compelled to walk” (Freemen 1844: 67). On another occasion when approaching 
the Prah River from the Fanti side again, “The road also was exceedingly bad, being in many 
places not more than nine inches wide, full of wholes, and roots of trees rising above the 
ground” (Ibid: p. 16). This difference seems to suggest that the Ashanti Empire was indeed 
much more active than Fanti in road maintenance. 
On one occasion, an Ashanti king cleared a road on behalf of a foreign missionary. In this 
case, the king dispatched men to clear fallen trees from the road to open the way for the 
passage of a carriage to Kumasi. Nevertheless, the missionary claimed that the stumps and 
roots of trees were still a problem on the rest of the road. This is difficult to read precisely, 
but it probably refers to the more regular condition of the road itself, which, again, 
historically would have hosted travellers on foot, not on wheels and hence stumps and roots 
were never an issue until now (Ibid: p. 102). This suggestion is borne out by complaints by 
British army engineers in the Ashanti War in the 1870s who commented: 
The falling of trees across the road was also a constant difficulty; not one of the least 
obstacles to progress being the need for cutting through their enormous trunks which 
lay across the road and barred the path. Some of these trees had trunks of hard wood, 
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Mahogany and iron-wood, 4 or 5 feet in diameter; and of course the appliances for 
cutting them were limited (Brackenberry 1874: 1.315).
11
 
One of the most revelatory aspects of Ghanaian and Burmese historical culture, noted in 
traveller accounts from the pre-colonial period was a more reserved and even hostile attitude 
to foreigners in Konbaung Burma than comparable travellers found in Ashanti of the same 
time and this was especially true of the main cultural core of Ashanti. As Iver Wilks has 
suggested, the “foreigner” as an abstract category was considered with less hostility in the 
Akan (the base population group of Ashanti) world than might be the case in other societies, 
such as that of Burma. The Ashanti Empire was built on encouraging mobility and in fact its 
wellbeing depended upon it. Wilks pioneered the study of the “great-roads of Asante” in his 
1975 monograph and related work. It would be useful at this point to summarize Wilks’ 
sketch of the Ashanti administration of transportation and movement in the pre-colonial 
period. As Wilks shows, an economic motive was not the only factor in influencing Ashanti 
administrative approaches to their road network. The scope and speed of travel determined 
the territorial structure of the Ashanti Empire. Wilks, referring to a minimal message-delay, 
explains that the ability of the king’s messengers to reach a certain point after so many days, 
determined what was centrally ruled (the royal capital to the metropolitan regional boundary 
six to twelve days). Outside of this circle was an outer concentric ring of inner provinces (one 
month from the capital), then frontier districts (five to seven weeks). Further out was territory 
where “the exercise of political control ceased to be realistically attainable” and so outside of 
these were “adjunct territories” and then foreign polities (Wilks 1975: 61). An elaborate 
administrative apparatus was developed to maintain traffic and royal revenues on the great-
roads rather than regulating domestic access to the roads or domestic movement. The 
akwanmofo managed traffic facility – it repaired roads, mobilizing villagers, using free and 
paid labor, in the vicinity to do the work, and generally sought to remove obstacles to free 
movement on the Great Roads. Another administrative unit, the nkwansrafo (the king’s path-
keepers or highway police), garrisoned control points on the routes close to the frontiers of 
the kingdom to monitor the flow of commodities and extract customs duties, being quite 
literally a force that enforced the control point as customs house. The actual garrisoning of 
the road was only done at control points where the great-roads intersected with on-going 
maritime or overland routes (Wilks 1992: 175; Wilks 1975: 17, 49, 55). Importantly, the 
Ashanti Empire did not attempt to restrict travel on the roads beyond extracting customs or 
preventing entrance by hostile forces.  
The Ashanti Empire instead ensured that materially and spiritually travellers were 
protected from the environment, the gods, and other bad-meaning people. The court also 
established a number of halting points explicitly for the purpose of providing shelter and 
sustenance for travellers on the way to and from Kumasi. Complementing the court’s 
patronage is this regard was the more autonomous erection of travel shrines. There was the 
danger for travellers that they would anger the High God of Ashanti or local family gods. In 
Ashanti this was resolved by circumscribing a special space for foreign travellers that meant 
                                                 
11 Claims that the indigenous population pulled such trees down over the road on purpose appear to be 
misinformed. 
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they would not anger these gods and travel shrines were erected that protected the travellers 
along the great- road they were on (Wilks 1975: 25).  
Thus, comparing pre-colonial movement on Burma and Ashanti provides us with very 
great contrasts regarding movement and mobility. Scott suggests for the comparativist “a 
gradient of mobility, from a relative frictionless ability to relocate to a relative immobility” 
(Scott 2009: 184). We might find Ashanti sitting somewhere very close to the frictionless end 
and Konbaung Burma much closer to the mobility side of the scale. 
The Intermediary Period of Multiple State-spaces 
In the intermediary period between pre-colonial kingdoms and colonial states, new means of 
transportation entered the indigenous mind-set and foster new thinking about motive power, 
movement, and speed. From West Africa to the Java, a swathe of pre-colonial kingdoms was 
being cut up an annexed in pieces as part of a gradual process of European conquest. The 
slow progressive nature of this process meant that for decades various societies in Africa, 
South Asia, and Southeast Asia had a mixed period in which such areas had both a pre-
colonial kingdom and a colonial state with pretensions to the other. 
This period was important as a learning phase for both indigenous courts and societies and 
European administrators. Intellectually, the period saw the inroads of European ideas about 
transportation and related technology. New means of transportation were very vigorously 
promoted not so much by one government to the other but largely by other agents who did so 
for different reasons. These included locomotive manufacturers who sent samples, 
missionaries who were proffering progress and “civilization”, and even rival governments 
that sought to obstruct expanding British influence in both cases. As one such agent recorded, 
“Our [c]arriage [a gift to the king from the Wesleyan Missionary Society] is the cause of a 
better road being made through this part of Ashanti, than has ever been seen before... good 
roads greatly promote civilization” (Freeman 1844: 119). 
Before the extension of colonial rule, stories of new forms of transportation reached the 
ears of the kings of Burma and Ashanti from merchants and missionaries. In both cases, 
special examples of the new kinds of transportation were provided to these kings, which 
aroused awareness in him that their incorporation would require infrastructural change. The 
King of Ashanti was reportedly “very much interested and astonished” in 1841 when 
informed of the rapidity of travel permitted by railroads and steam-packets (Freeman 1844: 
132). Further, when the same king received a gift of a carriage, the first in the royal capital, 
he found he had to undertake works within the confines of the royal capital to make use of the 
gift. The streets in Kumasi had to be widened and cleaned and new streets even had to be 
built. A letter of gratitude to the missionary society reported the king’s happiness that he 
would no longer have to burden his countrymen with the onerous activity of carrying him 
around on a chair (Freeman1844: 86). New technologies of transportation also seeped into the 
Burmese kingdom from the colonial areas as well. These had the effect that like the carriage 
in Ashanti, the locomotive in Burma was also influencing indigenous people about the new 
possibilities of transportation even before they arrived. This is evidenced in painting murals 
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on the southern approach to the Mahamuni Shrine in Mandalay, which can be seen in Figure 
2, and the inclusion of steamships in Jataka Story murals produced during the period.
12
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mural of Train in Upper Gallery of South Entrance of Mahamuni Shrine at 
Mandalay (Photograph by author) 
Local road building during this period was also a learning experience for Europeans across 
Africa and the Indian Ocean in the early 19th century. Herman Willem Daendels, the 
Governor-General of Java (1808-1811) is of course famous for the Great Post Road he built 
across Java (Doormont 2001: 15). Daendels’ effort was commercial, to link up interior 
products with Batavia, but it was political as well for where the road went, Dutch 
administrative and military control was strengthened. Like the road in Java, the great military 
road from Colombo to Kandy in Sri Lanka was a political contest, as Sujit Sivasundaram 
explains, to assure British authority and it consumed a decade’s worth of Governor Edward 
Barnes’ efforts to bring the road up the hills to the mountain city. As Sivasundaram shows, 
the British road-building project was built in communication with indigenous approaches to 
the roads both real and imagined. On the one hand, for example, the British made use of the 
rajakariya, the indigenous forced labor system, to build the road, and, on the other, undertook 
some initiatives, such as digging a particular tunnel (at Kurunegala) because this act would 
satisfy an indigenous legend that their political authority would only be assured when the 
tunnel had been made (Sivasundaram 2014: 227-231). In other words, it was not only the 
indigenous society that had to adapt to western innovation, but the westerners who had to 
listen to what indigenous societies thought was important about transportation. 
                                                 
12 These comments are based on personal observations the author made of the murals during fieldwork in 
Mandalay in June, 2014. 
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Even so, Europeans were credited with all road building by several generations of scholars 
working on the colonial period The aforementioned Daendels, who later found himself as 
Governor-General of the Dutch Gold Coast (1816-1818) and died there of fever in 1818, is a 
good example of this faulty attribution. Daendels had planned to build another such road 
connecting Elmina and Kumasi, but this was not begun before his death (Doormont 2001: 
15). The implication is that Daendels was introducing something new, but from the Ghanaian 
literature and the preceding history of road building it is pretty clear that he was going to add 
his road to an indigenous network already in place over the course of the preceding century. 
The Ashanti War almost gave Ghana what would later become its first railway in the early 
1870s.
13
 The Commander of the campaign, however, reported back that there was no time to 
lay a railway and so the material sent remained offshore and was never landed and the orders 
for more materials were countermanded. This made the completion of a road more important 
than it might otherwise have been (Brackenberry 1874: 1.309). But it also meant that the 
introduction of the railways would come during the phase of full colonial rule. Hostility at the 
frontier of Ashanti and the Gold Coast after the war of 1873 eradicated their interface at the 
frontier as a node in commerce with serious implications for trade in the southern portion of 
the king and thus the viability of the road network in this area. The commerce that formerly 
flowed down via the Great North Road through Ashanti to the Cape Coast ceased as the 
Ashanti Kingdom broke up and smaller, hostile chiefdoms emerged on the political terrain 
forming together an “impassable barrier” (Freeman 1898: 485-6).  
Trade now diverted away, from the north of Ashanti to the French Protectorate and down 
to the Coast of Assini and the Great North Road “rapidly degenerated into a bush-track” 
(Freeman 1898: 485-6). Roads within the Cape Coast in the early years of British rule fell 
into what was viewed by British engineers as serious disrepair. Rains had washed out parts of 
some roads, others were overgrown with vegetation, and some stretches were merely lengths 
of the beach. The main element that defined much of these roads as indeed being roads was 
that trees had been cleared up to fifteen feet across. Early recommendations were to construct 
drains along the roads.
14
 The British must have brought the condition of the roads under 
control for Wilks explains that when political opinion in Ashanti divided over whether it was 
worth holding onto resistant southern provinces, the majority went with the policy of 
surrendering their control to the British, because they now kept the roads open and in repair 
to the benefit of the entire Ashanti road system (Wilks 1975: 29). 
British efforts to build bridges fared just as poorly in Ashanti and Burma as other road-
building efforts fared in Sri Lanka when countered by the adverse environment, particularly 
the monsoonal rains. The Kandy Road in the latter case washed out twice a year, metalling 
the road was not even attempted until 1841, and the tunnel collapsed in 1849, forcing the road 
engineers to add another two miles of road skirting the mountain instead of going through it. 
Sivasundaram’s observation that Europeans of the period were having difficulty “apply[ing] 
                                                 
13
 In expected support of the military campaign, the War Office had dispatched a complete tramway, including a 
traction engine, 6.25 miles of track, and some trucks on transports and orders had been put in for more 
material as well (Brackenberry 1874: 1.309).  
14 R. Lonsdale, “Memorandum of Prince Buaki’s Journey from Elina to Accra, with Notes on the Condition of 
the Roads, etc, 13th to 22nd September 1881”, in House of Commons Command Paper 3386, “Further 
Correspondence on the Affairs of the Gold Coast”, p. 4. 
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their science to the tropical environment” (Sivasundaram 2014: 228-229), holds equally true 
for this intermediary period in the case of West Africa (Ghana) and Burma. As all travel in 
Ashanti was on foot and bridges were expensive to build and difficult to maintain for 
environmental reasons, any cost- benefit analysis would have cast doubt on the viability of 
extensive bridgeworks as opposed to the use of ferry canoes across rivers and streams. The 
court also did not normally invest in bridgeworks. In part this was likely because as all travel 
was on foot, bridge works would not have mattered significantly anyway given the 
availability of ferry canoes for river crossings (Freeman 1844: 17). Further, during the rains, 
rivers expanded dramatically and in delta areas even changed course from year to year 
(Brackenberry 1874: 2.237. 245). In such conditions, bridges could only be temporary, built 
for purpose, and of quickly gathered materials that were relinquished to nature afterwards or 
otherwise removed. In 1841, Freeman observed the building of temporary bridges on the 
order of the king for the passage of the gift carriage (Freeman 1844: 118). These bridges 
were, he explained, 
the...first attempts at making bridges I have seen in the interior. They are constructed in 
the following manner: some stout, forked sticks or posts are driven in the centre of the 
stream, at convenient distances across which are placed some strong beams, fastened to 
the posts with withes, from the numerous climbing plants on every hand. On these 
bearers are placed long stout poles, which are covered with earth, from four to six 
inches thick; and this completes the bridge. ... (Freeman 1844: 118). 
The cultural legacy of this was that the “bridge” in the indigenous view was not a permanent 
structure and its materials were free for re-use after its immediate purpose was over. This led 
to situations that horrified British army engineers in the Ashanti War as their indigenous 
allies ripped apart the bridges they had just built. As one engineers recalled: “I find ... that 
much injury is done to the road, bridges and fascines over swamps by the native allies, who 
tear up the bridges for firewood, and pull out the fascines for the same purpose” 
(Brackenberry 1874: 1.315). This thus hindered the influence of bridgeworks for some time. 
In support of the “strategic road” constructed into Ashanti by Royal Engineers during the 
Ashanti War 237 bridges were built (Brackenberry 1874: 1.316). The British destroyed at 
least some of these bridges themselves, including the bridge over the Prah River, when they 
withdrew at the conclusion of the Ashanti War (Brackenberry 1874: 2.276). The other 
bridges left intact fared poorly over the following decade and a half, most being in an 
“advanced state of decay” or disappearing altogether and some replaced merely by a log 
thrown over the stream (Freeman 1898: 25). 
It took until the Campaign of 1873 for the British to be able to demonstrate that they knew 
how to build a road just as well as could the Ashanti. In preparation for the march of the 
British Army into Ashanti, British military engineers went to work putting the roads into a 
condition that would permit the advance of a European army in stages in reaction to changing 
events. Prior to the arrival of the commander, Lieutenant Gordon had made road up to 
Yancoomassie Fanti but only so far as clearing a path of a width sufficient for movement – 
the road surface was not yet suitable for the march of soldiers and artillery. To achieve the 
latter, Major Home and the Royal Engineers were tasked with widening the road to twelve 
feet, clearing all stubs and roots, draining the swamps or building causeways through them, 
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building culverts, and erecting bridges over all streams (Brackenberry 1874: 1.310). The 
“strategic road” thus built remained in good condition fifteen years later when another British 
expedition passed over it in 1888 (Freeman 1898: 25). 
Attention to this intermediary period is important for two reasons. First, it demonstrates 
that European technology was not a ‘shock’ package that was introduced by colonial armies 
on the completion of conquest. Rather, European transportation technologies were well-
known and often rejected long before colonial rule was cemented, at least completely, after a 
period when indigenous courts and societies weighed and rejected or neglected what was on 
offer. Second, such failures often meant that while Europeans awaited advances in 
technology that would be better suited to West Africa and mainland Southeast Asia, they had 
to engage with what transportation networks were already in existence.  
The slowness of change impacted both the political centre’s approach to movement and 
the relationship of users, the people, to movement in several ways. Religious pilgrimage, an 
exception to royal restrictions on movement in Burma, saw the introduction of religious 
amulets, some of them being miniature replicas of the Mahabodhi Temple and Buddhism, as 
a universal salvation religion offered protection beyond the locale as mentioned earlier. 
Regarding road travel, however, the erection of nat-shrines, to propitiate local spirits, may 
have been more important. In pre-colonial Ghana, this protection had come from the king, but 
the slow introduction of colonial rule and separate spiritual fields in the north and the south 
during the intermediary period allowed for the religious accommodation of mobility in 
Ghana. Protection of travellers would come from spirit-cults introduced by northern migrants 
into Ghana, often focused on “anti-witchcraft shrines” built alongside the roads (Klaeger 
2009: 227), in a manner similar to nat shrines. These spirit cults were then copied by 
southerners that were then established in the north as well, providing protection for both 
mobile populations (Bruijn, Dijk, & Dijk 2001: 79-80). As Klaeger (2009: 231) and Ntewusu 
(2014: 15-7) have shown for contemporary Ghana, this kind of spiritual protection over 
Ghanaian travel has permeated the road system itself, so that not only are road accidents seen 
as the result of negative spiritual activity, but the act of road-building requires ritual and ritual 
specialists to investigate and undertake the work.  
The slowness of the introduction of European transportation also meant that the evolving 
colonial states were influenced at least indirectly by the existing condition of transportation in 
Ghana and Burma and with this influence, it is suggested, came certain orientations towards 
the management of popular movement and travel. It is also possible that the same constraints 
and opportunities that shaped pre-colonial attitudes towards free or control movement would 
have similarly influenced the colonial state to adopt the same perspectives. In either case, 
there was good reason for continuity in governmentality towards transportation and 
movement. This continuity will be explored in the following section. 
The Colonial Period 
A good deal of the literature has viewed the colonial state as an external imposition that 
differed from the patrimonial kingdoms and chiefdoms they encountered and conquered in 
both Africa and Asia. Some literature has seen the colonial state as an interregnum and have 
viewed the military regimes that began to sweep Asia and Africa from the 1950s, all 
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succeeding earlier, failed civil democratic experiments, as representing a return to the pre-
colonial African and Asian ruling elites’ reliance on military force for the extraction of 
resources.
15
 Some scholars have seen continuity through the entire era of the colonial 
experience. Although regime change indeed took place, it is observed, colonial states 
commonly introduced mixed administrative systems in which traditional institutions were 
curtailed but maintained alongside “modern” governance systems as part of divide and rule 
policies. Other scholarship on Africa has gone further and argued that European role was so 
short-lived and so negligible in its penetration into the interior that the colonial period left 
weak national institutional structures and a poor network infrastructure. This mixture of 
authority often survived independence, contributing to the stability of central rule in some 
former colonies and to political instability in others, Myanmar and Nigeria being two major 
examples where this legacy has resulted in major civil wars (Michalopolous & Papaioannou 
2011: 1, 5). 
However much colonial states ensconced themselves in the vocabulary of modernity when 
they put their faith in the importance of new steam and then gasoline technologies, they were 
still strongly influenced and shaped by the pre-existing court approaches to transportation and 
the transportation networks. Rather than writing new transport networks on a blank sheet, 
these colonial states in both Ghana and Burma were slow introductions that gradually 
absorbed what was already in place. New colonial transport systems in these cases were 
actually hybrid systems that grew in a conversation with pre-existing road and river networks 
and with the cultures of royal control over traffic that long predated the arrival of Europeans. 
Local European traders, administrators, and engineers found they would have to deal with 
these constraints and opportunities if they were going to make significant headway. The 
colonial state’s approach to transportation in both Ghana and Burma was realized through a 
pre-existing indigenous framework. 
More generally, in both Ghana and Burma, the existing roads did not disappear as routes. 
In Ghana, the old great-roads of Ashanti were to become the foundation of new motor roads 
that were built over them. In the early twentieth century, the great-roads were no longer 
functioning as great-roads, but they were still there physically and the system of travel they 
sustained would largely continue on to the present; two-thirds of the great-road system 
becoming motor roads (Wilks 1975: 13). As motor roads, the old great-roads interconnected 
with paths and side roads that generally kept the Ashanti transportation networks intact. The 
railways of the Gold Coast focused on the maritime port trade and especially that which 
served the gold mining operations and not the general economy. In Ghana, alternative options 
of travel meant that Ghanaian autonomy of movement and with it political autonomy, saw 
continuity, while simultaneously, European dependence on the railway for mining and other 
forms of resource extraction meant that West African colonial states became increasingly 
vulnerable to African economic and political empowerment movements partly derived and 
supported by the organizational power of the railway’s labor union as well as those in other 
strategic industries, demonstrated in the form of railway strikes early in the postwar period, 
first in Nigeria in 1945 and then in Ghana in 1947 (Jeffries 1978; Cooper 1992: 21). 
                                                 
15 The intellectual heritage for these views lay in African historiography (Aungwom 2001: 93). 
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Although railway extensions would be built from the 1920s these never really escaped 
competition from the roads. The first permanent road bridges and better roads built in Ashanti 
and the Gold Coast were for bicycles. Some District Commissioners there were doing 
anywhere from 32 to 45 miles in a day on their bicycles on their rounds and the bridges and 
roads made these journeys much less onerous and faster than they might otherwise be. From 
1915, such work began to be conducted on motorcars, especially on the Ford Model T, 
making bridges or at least heavier duty river ferries indispensable (Williamson 2000: 9). 
When the British entered their last stage of expansion in Burma in the Third Anglo-
Burmese War (1885) and the subsequent pacification campaign, roads were essential for 
establishing their control and assuring tight administration. As the Burmese royal roads, the 
kingdom’s military roads had been arranged with military reach in mind, they were well 
suited to adaptation to British needs. In 1886, in the Mandalay area alone, the British 
reformed (rather than construct afresh) fifteen miles of road, metaled them, and rebuilt the 
existing bridges. Outside of these roads, the British also turned partially to finishing some 
two hundred miles of country roads. Where other routes of passage were necessary, such as 
between military outposts, the soldiers themselves cleared jungle and forest to form 
temporary forest tracks of about one hundred feet in width (Croswaite 1912: 67). 
Like the pre-colonial Burmese kingdom, the colonial government saw the Irrawaddy river 
network as western Burma’s transportation artery, a main thoroughfare of great capacity, 
access to which in an out could be controlled by the military and monitored and taxed by the 
customs administration. For the landlocked eastern part of the country, the British saw the 
railway as best alternative to the Irrawaddy and the IFC. In building the railways, though, the 
new railway lines were laid on top of the old road beds (the first being the roads from 
Rangoon to Prome and from Rangoon to Toungoo) and as these roads always had in the past, 
the railways now built on top of them linked up with the river and a number of different 
points (in particular at Mandalay, Prome, Bassein, and Rangoon). To take one example, one 
hundred miles of the Rangoon to Prome Railway line that were opened on 2 May 1877 
consisted of the old Rangoon-Prome Road, which had been given to the railway construction 
engineers for this purpose. The bridges that had existed on the road, being made of wood, 
were now replaced with iron bridges that could support rail traffic. This last effort led the 
construction engineer to argue that building railway lines over normal provincial roads was 
an exercise in doubtful economy. Although a road bed built for cart traffic might support rail 
traffic, gradients, curves, and banks had to be remade to conform with requirements.
16
 
As was true of the pre-colonial kingdom, a certain governmentality regarding popular 
movement influenced policies towards the railways and the feeder roads that serviced them. 
Certain acts of legislation, such as the Village Act that tied down the Burmese to their local 
village circle under the watchful eye of the village headman, get a great deal of attention, but 
scholars have paid little attention to the government road construction that appears to have 
been designed to discourage free movement of Burmese if not general mobility altogether.  
In Burma, the British turned the roads into what some scholars have called “technologies 
of standardization and control” in which certain roads became the single “institutionalized 
route through the landscape” in order to focus all economic activity on the export economy 
                                                 
16 IOR P 2884 Railway Reports, p. 17. 
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(Harvey 2006: 131, citing Wilson 204, n.p.). Colonial engineering and equipment was put to 
work to ensure that when Burmese moved they did so only when, how, and by what routes 
the government wished. Through the army and then through the Public Works Department, 
the colonial government physically reconstructed the Burmese landscape, both in building the 
railways and in ruining alternative forms of transport, sometimes by design but also by 
accident as well. Before motor vehicles, for example, most potential road traffic was viewed 
as being within indigenous hands and it was best to redirect this traffic to feed the railway, 
which by 1902 had become a private company, but one upon which the colonial state was 
heavily dependent. Roads built in the west were thus built to feed the river traffic and roads 
built in the east were merely feeder roads of short length that forced people to take their 
goods to the railway stations (Maung Shein 1964: 38). While that effort was purposeful, there 
are also examples of where the British ruined alternative transportation accidentally as well. 
British water engineering works, for example, which had been intended to aid irrigation in the 
eastern part of the colony, made local rivers un-navigable, ruining port towns along the way. 
By the time this work was over, Curzon’s vision had become a reality – Burma really did 
only have two great transportation avenues, the Irrawaddy River in the west and the railway 
in the east.  
We have a fairly good understanding of the transportation history of Ghana since World 
War I because of the substantial secondary literature devoted to it by contemporary 
historians.
17
 Ghana saw the introduction of new motor vehicles that increased popular 
mobility, employment as locomotive drivers and later as motor vehicle entrepreneurs.
18
 Much 
of this colonial era of mobility opportunity was due to the nature of the Ghanaian economy. 
Cocoa farmers used the profits from their sales to buy lorries that could take the cocoa to 
buying agents. Some of these lorries and their Ghanaian owner-drivers can be seen in Figure 
3. At first this meant going to the railways, but soon motor vehicles were taking this directly 
to the port. This process, in which Africans operated motor vehicles independently and 
developed a culture of mobility around it, has been called “African automobility” (Hart 
2015).  
                                                 
17 The deadline for the submission of present article, prevented prior access to Jennefer Hart;s forthcoming 
book on Ghanaian mobility (Hart 2016). 
18 While this has conferred prestige in Ghanaian society, something that has persisted into the present, this 
status is somewhat ambiguous (Klaeger 2009: 226). 
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Figure 3: Photograph of cocoa lorries waiting to load in the mid-1920s (reproduced from 
Government of the Gold Coast 1925, p. 124). 
It would be an overstatement not to admit that there were no colonial laws or officials who 
sought to control how Africans used transport, for there were and they did (Hart 2015). Often 
this was over safety concerns or because it challenged European notions of how a vehicle 
should be used. What was apparently not curtailed by government intervention, however, was 
autonomous indigenous mobility per se. Admittedly, the colonial government in Ghana was 
mainly concerned at first with railway development as this was essential for the gold mines, 
but they still encouraged road building (although indigenous people would have to do the 
work on their own). In the colonial period, these feeder and connecting roads were built on 
the basis of local knowledge, with an eye to their being suitable for human porterage and they 
relied upon local resources for materials. Just as many of these colonial-era roads were not 
suitable to motor traffic at all, many of the roads constructed today between communities 
remain un-motorable to modern buses (Ntewusu & Nanbigne 2015: 197).  
Although motorized transport, as mentioned above, became available from the 1920s, this 
mode of transport predominated in the south while the north, because of the topography and 
the fact that there was greater poverty in the north, the cheaper bicycle predominated in the 
north (Ntewusu & Nanbigne 2015: 201). As with the colonial state, the modern Ghanaian 
government has actively promoted mobility and popular access to transport. Samuel Ntewusu 
has pioneered scholarship on transportation in subnational areas of Ghana with work mainly 
examining districts in Northern Ghana. Ntewusu and Edward Nanbigne have shed light on 
the Ghanaian government’s role in making cheaper forms of transport available to larger 
numbers of people in the country. This began in the early 1960s with the government’s 
encouragement to Yugoslavia to open a motorcycle plant in the northern town of Tamale; 
although it did not materialize the socialist nation did open up shops in northern Ghana to sell 
cheap motorcycles. More recently, in the   last ten years, the government has developed a 
programme to promote the use of motor tricycles. This was begun in December 2012 with the 
Community Motor Tricycle Project to train 120,000 local youth how to use a special kind of 
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motor tricycle, known as the motor king, and the following year began distributing tricycles 
as well (Ntewusu & Nanbigne 2015: 201).  
By contrast, the Burmese saw from the beginning of the colonial-era restrictions on the use 
of the vehicles that had historically allowed them the limited mobility they had exercised 
because of the equally limited oversight of the state on travel within the country. Colonial 
laws in Burma completed the work begun by the Public Works Department in eradicating the 
autonomy of traditional, indigenous means of on-and-off-the-road cross-country transport. 
One was the requirement that indigenous carts that wished to access the new government 
feeder roads wrap their wheels with a three- inch wide iron rim, known as the tyre (Scott 
1924: 317). Indigenous cartwheels were until this time slab wheels, solidly built, not 
hollowed out and rimmed or spoked. An example of one type of slab wheel (Burmese, kya-bi, 
literally, slab + wheel) can be viewed in Figure 4. Such a wheel either solid or was 
constructed out of several pieces of wood fastened together and cut in the shape of a circle. 
The slab wheel was also convex-sided, being thickest at the centre and then ‘tapered’ out to 
the thinner edges of the wheel. For this reason, the slab wheel was superior to the spoked 
wheel during rainy and muddy conditions, especially when roads were in actually muddy 
wheel-tracks. Since the wheel was thinner around the edges and there were no crevices, as a 
spoked wheel would provide, such wheels moved through mud much more easily than would 
spoked wheels (Nisbet 1901: 1.377-378; Shway Yoe 1997: 81; Ferrars & Ferrars 1900: 138; 
Scott 1924: 317; Williams 1922: 136).  
 
 
Figure 4: Pre-colonial Burmese cart with one type of slab-wheel, published in the ‘Illustrated 
London News’, 22 June 1889 (Author’s private collection) 
Slab wheels were very much disliked by colonial authorities because they were heavy and 
jagged and thus did damage to the new metaled roads the British had built. These roads were 
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sometimes glazed over with stone (including the green stone sometimes used as ballast by 
ships originating in Europe), but “mostly with balls of burned brick apt to be easily 
pulverized during the hot season” (Nisbet 1901: 1.376-377). As one observer described them, 
“the tendency of cart bullocks to follow in a worn track causes the road surface to be worn in 
two deep furrows, while the metaled surface in the middle remains intact” (Scott 1924: 316). 
The addition of metal tyres it was argued would prevent this damage. Indigenous people had 
a choice of either not adding the tyres, which meant they could not bring goods or foodstuffs 
to the railways, which were now the only show in town, or adding the tyres and getting 
access to trade at railheads, but abandoning autonomous travel on muddy rural paths. Most 
chose the former and indigenous carts’ solid wheels gave way to spoked wheels, which were 
no longer a problem for the feeder roads, but were problematic on pathways (Nisbet 1901: 
1.376-377). 
As we have seen already with engineering, the colonial state excelled at realizing desires it 
and pre-colonial ruling elites had always had to exert oversight and control on popular 
mobility. Administrative mechanisms lent data gathering and registration tools to aid the 
process of immobilizing indigenous transportation that was autonomous of colonial 
oversight. First, carts and wagons were enumerated. Second, with the colonial erection of 
municipalities, carts which were available for “hire in urban districts” had to be licensed. 
Third, with enumeration and licensing, it became possible to force traditional Burmese cart 
owners and operators to undertake the required changes to their vehicles for otherwise they 
would be denied access to the road. According to Nisbet, the changes to the road system saw 
an “enormous” increase in the production and use of indigenous carts (Nisbet 1901: 1.379).  
But this was not the case. The “indigenous carts” referred to after licensing were in fact a 
new kind of cart, rebuilt to European-imposed specifications. They were not the old versions 
that now rapidly disappeared in all but the most out of the way places (Shway Yoe 1927: 81). 
Unfortunately, unlike the latter that were very well suited for all-terrain use, the new wheels 
were not. As a result, there were more indigenous carts now, but their use was limited to the 
semi-paved and metaled roadways that fed the railways. Commercial traffic and even human 
movement lost its autonomy and now was directed almost entirely in the direction of easily 
monitored government or government-aligned transportation networks, the Irrawaddy River 
(dominated by the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company) and the railway network (a Burma Railways 
monopoly). Broadly, these changes to transportation under colonial rule were consistent with 
those desired by, but beyond the capacity of, the pre-colonial kingdom in Burma. 
These monopolies would be challenged in the late colonial period from many quarters. 
More economically and politically empowered Burmese tore away at these monopolies from 
the 1920s. From the 1930s, road competition and the building by the colonial state of new 
roads also began to take off, but with a carrying capacity nowhere near that which remained 
in the hands of the IFC and the Burma Railways, the latter becoming again in 1928 a 
government-owned enterprise. But these roads, building on the laws already in place for 
application against indigenous carts, were the home of motorcars and not ox-carts. As 
transportation sped up, reliance on the tediously slow traditional carts was fast becoming 
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economical anyway.
19
 While urban-dwelling Burmese would own and use motorcars 
themselves, the motor car did not provide the same kind of freedoms that indigenous carts 
and un-metaled roads had provided because of dependence on fuel, the provision of which 
could be more easily controlled by the colonial state than the monitoring or the entire 
transportation network. Control of access to fuel, to the purchase of automobiles, and access 
to major roads represented one means of controlling mobility that carried into post-colonial 
Burma. Ultimately, Ne Win would introduce in 1962 more direct and formal restrictions on 
freedom of movement (Turku 2016: 16) that would severely restrict mobility among Burmese 
for the next half century. 
At the end of the colonial period, Burma had deeply rooted controls over movement 
beyond locales and Ghana had free, both politically and physically, movement of people. To 
briefly touch on what are long-term and complicated developments, the first of the two states 
veered off towards military rule and authoritarianism by the 1960s. The other, after a number 
of failed efforts at authoritarian and military rule in the 1960s to 1992, became one of West 
Africa’s strongest democracies. In fact, Ghana is regularly referred to as the poster-child for 
Democracy in West Africa, Africa’s “model democracy” and a host of other referents 
commenting positively on its democratic experience (Boafo-Arthur 2008). To assert that pre-
existing, pre-colonial government attitudes to movement and mobility ensured that modern, 
independent Ghana and Burma would have the contemporary regimes that they have today 
would be reductionist. To suggest so was not the intention of this article. Instead, it is 
suggested, there was a continuity in how this governmentality became embedded in evolving 
attitudes towards what today would fall under the heading of public transportation 
infrastructure. 
Conclusion 
The continuity in approaches to movement and transportation between pre-colonial and 
colonial West Africa and Southeast Asia, as examined in the cases of Ghana and Burma 
contribute in part to an explanation of the political trajectory of these states after 
independence. Ghana has seen postcolonial political conditions with weak central control 
over localities and although from the 1990s it has had a relatively healthy Democracy, the 
Democratic record has been spotted for a few years at a time by experiments in authoritarian 
rule and number of military coups and even military rule of no more than a few years in 
length. It could be said that despite political instability from the 1950s to 1992, authoritarian 
traditions were very weak and unstable and certainly controls on local movement were even 
weaker. By contrast, Burma has seen traditions of efforts to assert very tight central control 
over localities and where it has not had military rule or predominant military control it has 
seen authoritarianism.  
Despite British rule and a similar focus in the economy on the export of primary 
agricultural produce (cocoa in one and rice in the other) and mineral and precious metal 
extraction (gold in Ghana and silver, zinc, and bauxite in Burma), the policies of both 
colonial states towards popular mobility in their respective charges could not have been more 
                                                 
19 Williams described Burmese ox-carts as “terribly slow conveyances” and estimated their speed at about two 
miles an hour, with a daily tally of ten miles (Williams 1922: 140). 
Charney: Before and after the wheel    33 
different. It is unclear whether a great many factors contributed to or were symptomatic of 
their respective negative (Burma) or positive (Ghana) orientations towards mass mobility. For 
example, both Burma and Ghana experienced a series of very serious Anglo-indigenous wars 
but whereas Burma’s final conquest led to a counter-insurgency campaign with prolonged 
and very significant controls on personal freedoms and movement (the Village Act), this did 
not occur in Ghana. Was this difference due to the particular commanders involved in the war 
and suppression or was it due to the long-term local context, one in which the British listened 
to the indigenous elites with whom they collaborated in suppression, men like the famous 
Kinwun Mingyi who themselves had been administrative officials in control of movement 
(this official, who became an adviser to the colonial regime, had in earlier days been in 
charge of a border outpost and later the Chief Minister of the court)? We might also ask if 
there was a difference in the way the Colonial Office and the Indian Office approached 
colonial rule and if their influence had some bearing on the colonial forces that suppressed 
the Ashanti and Burmans respectively. 
Certainly one factor was the pre-colonial culture of mobility. The pre-colonial kingdoms, 
not the colonial states, helped to set the template for government attitudes towards popular 
mobility for the post-colonial societies that followed. As examined here, Burma is the model 
of a society that was ruled by royal courts and a colonial state that were mass mobility-
averse. The existence of resulting controls on movement, however ineffective regarding 
domestic roads, may help to explain the significant role of Chinese overland traders to some 
degree, but more particularly the important role of ethnic minorities like the Shan in 
managing pre-colonial and colonial trans-border trade. By contrast, the Ashanti Kingdom and 
the colonial state that followed might be characterized more as mobility-encouraging states. 
Contemporary Ghana and Burma have certainly inherited these very different approaches to 
individual freedoms and controls on individual movement, one that was very empowering 
and the other which was very restrictive and which some very clearly rebelled against. 
Clearly, the extension of British rule in the Gold Coast over Ashanti was partially welcomed 
by a least some sections of the indigenous population because it offered through road 
construction, repair, and maintenance to provide the same kind of service, with an 
intensification of investment and capacity that the pre-colonial kingdom had provided. In 
Burma, the same kinds of direct and indirect controls on movement were applied by the 
colonial state as had been under pre-colonial rule, with the opposite reaction – many did not 
like it. To oversimplify a complex debate and diverse and rich literature, the question should 
focus not on state-space or non-state-space, but on what happens in that space. Another 
assertion is that we really need to give late early modern states in Africa and Southeast Asia 
their peculiar due administratively, intellectually, and militarily rather than lump them 
together as I have done in the present article for coherence and clarity, as part of the pre-
colonial kingdom. On-going developments in them set them apart as they do in Europe, both 
from their classical and even from their early-early modern predecessors. 
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